



ARMY 2020 FORCE STRUCTURE REALIGNMENT:

WHY THE ARMY SHOULD CUT 22,500 PERSONNEL IN HAWAII

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ABSTRACT

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The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states the active Army must reduce from its war-time high of 570,000 to 440,000–450,000 soldiers and if FY 2016 sequestration-level cuts are imposed, active component end-strength would need to be reduced further to 420,000. The Army is now in the midst of analyzing where these personnel cuts will occur across bases in 19 states with the intent to implement the cuts by year 2020 as part of the Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment. The Army's analysis includes many factors; however, there are three overriding criteria that must be considered for deciding which bases should be at the top of the list for personnel cuts. The first of these criteria should be proximity and ease of access to essential transportation nodes. Are base personnel and unit equipment located near adequate seaports with readily available cargo ships, large airports capable of quickly accommodating C17 and C5 aircraft, or railheads if not immediately collocated next to these essential nodes? The second criteria should be the availability of adequate training areas for units to achieve and maintain their combat readiness. And finally, the third criteria should be the operational and maintenance costs associated with the actual basing requirements for the personnel, unit equipment, logistics and families. Using these criteria, Army forces located on the island of Oahu, state of Hawaii, should be at the top of the list for personnel cuts. Simply stated, if the Army cannot adequately train on Oahu, is not able to achieve and maintain its combat readiness there, cannot deploy quickly from there and pays a fortune to be based there, then of the 19 states under consideration for Army personnel cuts, Hawaii should be the top choice.



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ARMY 2020 FORCE STRUCTURE REALIGNMENT:

WHY THE ARMY SHOULD CUT 22,500 PERSONNEL IN HAWAII

"The Army is downsizing, the Army is in a downward budget. . . . we're looking for cost-effectiveness, and if it costs so much to be able to do this in Hawaii, people are going to look (at that). It's just common sense."

- Lt. General Wiercinski, U.S. Army, Retired, former USARPAC Commander¹

Introduction and Brief Historical Baseline:

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states the active Army must reduce from its war-time high of 570,000 to 440,000–450,000 soldiers, and if sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY 2016, active component end-strength would need to be reduced further to 420,000. The Army is now in the midst of analyzing where these personnel cuts will occur across bases in 19 states with the intent to implement the cuts by the year 2020 as part of its Army 2020 Force Structure Realignment. Although the Army identified Hawaii for 19,800 potential personnel cuts, the Army's arbitrary 16,000 personnel cap for each base should be lifted in Hawaii's case and the total cuts, including the 25th Infantry Division and its directly related support units, should actually be 22,500 military and civilian personnel. The Army reported in its Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment that a total of 24,969 soldiers and civilians are currently assigned to Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter.


In 1873, Major General John M. Schofield surveyed Pearl Harbor to evaluate its military potential, and for more than a century, Hawaii has played a major role as a headquarters for the U.S. Army in the Pacific. Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States annexed Hawaii. With the annexation of the islands, soldiers of the 1st New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 2nd U.S. Volunteer Engineers arrived in Honolulu on August 16, 1898, establishing Camp McKinley near Diamond Head. The Army's mission was to defend Oahu and the newly established naval station at Pearl Harbor. Fort Shafter, the first permanent Army post in Hawaii, was established in 1907. As a companion installation, Schofield Barracks began in 1909 on the Leilehua Plain in the central region of Oahu. Between 1908 and 1911, coastal defense guns were placed along the southern coasts at Forts Ruger, DeRussy, Armstrong, Kamehameha and Weaver. [Source: www.mybaseguide.com]

When Army and Navy forces in Hawaii and the Philippines came under attack in 1941, Hawaii quickly became a strategic hub. The Hawaiian Department became the Army component command under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. At this point the Asia-Pacific Region clearly became a maritime theater better served by naval and expeditionary forces like those possessed by the United States Marine Corps and more recently to some degree, the United States Air Force. Static conventional Army forces that are not equipped, funded or trained to conduct expeditionary or "forced entry" operations are largely irrelevant to the Pacific Theater, except in isolated peace-keeping operations that require units be stationed in Japan and South Korea. However, these are cold-war legacy missions that do not justify maintaining a large Army presence in the very expensive, remote island state of Hawaii.

With the political power and dominance held by Senator Daniel Inouye during the past thirty or more years, the military-industrial complex in Hawaii has thrived. Billions of defense dollars are diverted to Hawaii that now serve as an economic engine pumping \$14.7 billion annually, making the military in Hawaii the second most important industry just behind tourism. Much of this spending is justified and provides the United States a return on investment, except for spending on the Army. Fortunately for taxpayers, the amount spent on maintaining Army forces on Oahu is proportionately small (\$1.3 billion annually) even though Army personnel make up the largest population, bigger than all the other services on Oahu combined. Nevertheless, spending any valuable resources on isolated, noncombat ready, conventional Army forces that have virtually no relevant mission in the Pacific Theater other than to provide economic gratification is unjustifiable given the Army's current need to cut its forces.

Arguments are frequently made by very smart, high-placed leaders who tout the strategic relevance of Hawaii to the Asia-Pacific region. In many cases the claims are correct, as in the case of Navy and Air Force presence in Hawaii. But the case of Hawaii being a strategic location is not universally applicable, especially for the Army as will be discussed later. Under the days dominated by Senator Inouye, the discussion of Hawaii's alleged strategic relevance was taboo. Unfortunately many are still reluctant to have the debate out of fear of being haunted from the grave or, more likely, the fear of losing big dollars that go to big business, union interests and their many political champions throughout the state of Hawaii.

The Tyranny of Distance in the Pacific



Three Critical Criteria for Downsizing Selection:

There are three primary reasons why the Army should cut 22,500 forces in Hawaii on the island of Oahu (25th Infantry Division and support troops): 1) Lack of Combat Readiness Training Facilities, 2) Unavailability of Strategic Lift Assets, and 3) Exorbitant Stationing Costs.

1) Lack of Combat Readiness Training Facilities: The Army in Hawaii does not have adequate facilities to conduct critically essential company-level combined arms live-fire training nor immediately available open maneuver areas for its Stryker brigade. These training

areas are key to maintaining combat readiness to keep our soldiers prepared and our Nation safe. Army commanders can cite they can achieve such training on the Big Island of Hawaii and continental United States and that they can subjectively upgrade their units' combat readiness status – but all these options are impractical and have proven insufficient in the past.

- Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises: Combat units in Hawaii are unable to achieve required levels of combat readiness standards because of the inability to participate in company level Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises (CALFEX for short). There are significant shortcomings in the CALFEX facility on Oahu, including the fact that the Army has been unable to use the facility for ten years now due to environmental lawsuits. But more importantly, the CALFEX range is grossly inadequate, which if ever reopened, would still prevent Army units from experiencing the realistic training the Army desperately needs. In 2007, then US Representative Neil Abercrombie stated the following regarding the CALFEX range on Oahu, "This facility is not only not adequate, it's not even available. Does anybody think for a moment that these court cases are going to end?"²

- The CALFEX range was built in 1988, many years before the Army developed the Stryker vehicle and stationed a Stryker brigade at Schofield Barracks. The current range does not accommodate off-road use of Stryker vehicles and limits the Commander to employing only 5 of these 21 assigned mobile weapon systems. Moreover, the live-fire experience is crippled by nighttime restrictions, preventing commanders from practicing the critical tasks of integrating and coordinating a variety of weapon systems during periods of limited visibility. The range simply cannot accommodate company sized units, nor provide company or higher level commanders with realistic 24/7 combat conditions.

- Adequate Maneuver Areas: Having a Stryker brigade and combat aviation brigade on the island of Oahu is unrealistic. Maneuver areas to accommodate these weapons systems do not exist. Army commanders can claim there are many acres of maneuver training areas on the Big Island of Hawaii at Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), but virtually all of these lands are unnavigable with treacherous volcanic rock and numerous Hawaiian cultural sites. Maneuvers are limited to existing roads and live-fire ranges need many millions of dollars to upgrade them to suitable, realistic conditions equivalent to modern ranges located throughout the continental United States. Moreover, deploying equipment and soldiers from Oahu to the Big Island is cost-prohibitive in a sane world of fiscal responsibility.

- Superior training facilities are available on the mainland for use by Army forces stationed in Hawaii, but the costs are enormous in terms of money and stress on soldiers and their families. The skills obtained are also highly perishable due to their technical nature and the high unit turnover rate of personnel. Rotations of soldiers on tours lasting on average of 30 months long directly results in personnel turnover rates that approach 40% per year. This has a debilitating effect on units' ability to maintain their collective combat readiness skills and results in the very low combat readiness rates of Army brigades throughout the Army. Less than six months ago, former Vice President Dick Cheney reported an abysmal brigade readiness rate in the Army of 10 percent (only 4 out of 40 brigades combat ready). "Today, just 33 percent of our brigades are ready, when our sustained readiness rate should be closer to 70 percent", Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno told the Senate Committee on Appropriations on March 11, 2015.³ Maintaining a brigade's combat readiness is a challenge for commanders regardless of

their location; however, maintaining combat readiness of the brigades stationed in Hawaii without the proper training areas and doing so in a fiscally responsible manner is impossible.

- The 25th Infantry Division Commander, MG Flynn recently commented on his 2nd Brigade's recent training at the National Training Center (NTC) in California in May 2014 pegged at a cost of about \$25 million. "MG Flynn said the Army is going to take 'that investment of readiness' that comes from training at the national centers and place it forward in the theater west of the international dateline 'with Army forces in motion that are engaging, partnering, building relationships, training and helping to export the professionalism of our soldiers and our capabilities.'"⁴ However, in just a few short months the experience and certification achieved during this training will expire and require another major deployment to the NTC, which has yet to be scheduled. Certification lapses such as these occur frequently and can cause a brigade to remain noncombat ready for many years at a time; especially the brigades stationed in Hawaii. This coming May, 2015, about 3,500 3rd Brigade soldiers will head to the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana for complex, large-scale training – highly needed, highly expensive and highly perishable. Divisions located in more suitable locations than the 25th Infantry Division enjoy having home-station training facilities that allow these critical skills to be achieved much more frequently, cheaply and conveniently.

2) Unavailability of Strategic Lift Assets: The Pacific Theater is a maritime theater that is better served by Navy, Marine Expeditionary Forces and the US Air Force. The Army has no organic lift resources and cannot perform expeditionary or forced entry operations in the Pacific. The Pacific theater already has expeditionary, forced entry capable, air-ground-sea forces in the Marines – the Army is not capable, nor has it even been assigned this very complicated mission that requires special equipment, training and funding. The Nation cannot afford to have multiple forces claiming to do the same mission, with one fully capable and the other only pretending. There are places in the Pacific, including Joint Base Lewis-McCord, that make sense for Army basing, but Oahu is not one of them. When deliberate, follow on forces are required to provide security in the Pacific, the Army can provide this capability from anywhere in the world faster than deploying isolated, untrained forces from the island of Oahu.



Strategic Airlift

C-17 Globemaster III

- 300 flights are required to airlift one Stryker Brigade
- At best 5 aircraft might be operational at Hickam AFB

- While there are eight C-17 aircraft stationed on Oahu; this is nowhere near enough to move a reasonably sized force of any capability from Oahu. Airlift assets from around the World, but primarily the continental United States, have to be repositioned with very complicated logistics considerations for refueling, crew rest, maintenance, airfield and ramp capacity and coordination of safe, secure aerial ports of debarkation (APODs). The necessary logistics bridge that must be established to support forward deployed Army units takes weeks and months to establish even by air.

- The most likely scenario and historical norm for deploying any Army forces' equipment is by sea. This option is also problematic for the Army on Oahu because the closest available cargo ships (US flag carriers) are located on the west and east coasts, thousands of miles and many days or weeks away before equipment can even begin to be uploaded. Similarly to the airlift alternative, safe, secure sea ports of debarkation (SPODs) must exist and logistics lines of communication take months to mature to allow any substantive military operations to begin. Soldiers still have to deploy by air, requiring repositioning of national assets, both military and civilian. These requirements take time and are the reason the conventional Army is not designed, trained, equipped or funded for forced entry or expeditionary operations. Pretending an Army force isolated in the middle of the Pacific Ocean can deploy and function quickly without airlift, sealift, and adequate days of supply is foolish, irresponsible and a waste of precious resources.


Strategic Sealift



Roll on Roll Off Ships, Container Ships, Break Bulk Ships
NONE located in or near Hawaii

3) Exorbitant Stationing Costs: The financial realities of maintaining Army forces in the most expensive location in the Nation are self-evident. The cost of living in Hawaii is the highest in the Nation and this situation is equally debilitating for the Army. Moreover, transportation costs to ship items or personnel in or out of Hawaii are significantly higher than anywhere else in the Nation. The transportation costs alone should justify the relocation of Army forces to a more realistic location. Except for some locally grown produce and livestock, everything must be shipped in to Hawaii, including families, household goods and their cars – all of which are rotated in and out every two to three years. Equipment, logistics and soldiers ship in and out of Hawaii as though money is no object. Additional operating costs must also be considered in regards to sending military and civilian personnel back to the continental United States for training, meetings, conferences and yes, even live-fire training. It makes absolutely no sense to station noncombat ready, geographically isolated forces in the most expensive location possible.

30 Continental United States Fit in the Pacific Ocean



The illusive Pacific Pivot:

"The 'Pacific Pivot' of the United States is nothing new. At the same time, it doesn't really exist. And yet, even though it doesn't exist, this pivot is partly responsible for the escalation of tensions in and around the Korean peninsula. How can all three of these statements be simultaneously true? Such are the paradoxes of the U.S. shift in attention toward the Pacific Rim."

- John Feffer, Director, Foreign Policy In Focus⁵

"The Army is in genuine crisis at the moment," said Kori Schake, a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution who has served as director of defense strategy on the National Security Council. "They're grasping for a mission to justify their end-strength."⁶ "Now, for bureaucratic reasons -- to preserve its budget and troop levels in the face of the Obama administration's 'pivot toward Asia' -- the Army is now trying to reinvent itself as a sort of Marine

Corps II. The niggling fact is that a huge land war in East Asia is unlikely, except possibly in Korea. Any conflicts, like the Pacific theater during World War II, will likely be near or over water, something in which the Army is not well versed. In fact, taking advantage of the administration's pivot to defend their budgets during the long counterinsurgency wars, the Navy, Marines, and Air Force developed the Asia-centric 'air-sea' battle strategy. But the Army is not going down in the budgetary wars without a fight. . . . Instead of allowing the Army to become a second Marine Corps in Asia to retain excessive budget and force levels, the Army should keep only its existing missions and accept reduced funding and quantities of troops.”⁷

Many of our leaders and politicians cite that Hawaii is the gateway to the Pacific and the Army in Hawaii is at tip of the spear, forward deployed to engage quicker and better – and this was probably true up until WWII. These same folks cite the importance of the Army in Hawaii to satisfying the President's desire to rebalance the Nation's focus to the Asia-Pacific region. They also cite the need to keep our Allies reassured by having ready forces in Hawaii. But the logistics realities make it much easier to implement the President's policy and support our allies with the military instrument of power with USMC forces already in the Pacific and with Army forces as necessary that are located on the continental United States. We certainly do not surge and deploy State Department personnel to Hawaii to implement the political instrument of power; nor economists and businessmen to implement the economic instrument of power. Hawaii would be the last place to position such important civilian assets; the same logic should apply to stationing of the Army's assets.

“Calculating that there are only slim chances of the Army fighting a big land war anywhere in the Far East other than the Korean Peninsula, the new top Army commander in the Pacific, Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, wants his forces to more quickly and effectively respond to small conflicts, isolated acts of aggression and natural disasters. Doing so, however, has traditionally been a challenge for the Army, which bases most of its soldiers assigned to the Orient in Hawaii, Alaska and Washington state. To overcome what he calls ‘the tyranny of distance’, Brooks is trying to make his forces more maritime and expeditionary. The initiative, which Brooks is calling ‘Pacific Pathways’, is also an opportunity to recast the Army's image in Washington, yielding television images of soldiers — not just Marines and sailors — responding to typhoons and cyclones. . . . To the Marine Corps, however, Brooks is committing the military equivalent of copyright infringement. Marines regard themselves as the nation's first — and only — maritime infantry force.”⁸

Ironically there have been no visible signs indicating the Pacific Pivot is anything more than political rhetoric, except for incremental actions taken by the regional Army command, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) in trying to appear more relevant and engaged. “Army Lt. Gen. Anthony Crutchfield, the U.S. Pacific Command deputy commander, told the group [Chamber of Commerce Hawaii] that he is constantly asked in other countries in the Asia-Pacific, ‘Is the re-balance real?; Is the United States serious about this?’”⁹ These are reasonable questions given the obvious focus of the Defense Department, State Department and other federal departments on the Middle East, Russia and domestic issues. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have clearly shown their capabilities far exceeds the junior varsity level and they will both remain major threats to the United States and its allies despite wishful desires to the contrary. USARPAC's recent and obvious knee-jerk reaction to downsizing risks by creating the “Pacific Pathways” expeditionary effort contributes only in a negative effect to improving the combat readiness and

deployability of Army forces from Oahu and provides only a placebo effect for the alleged Pacific Pivot. Pacific Pathways should not be a reason to maintain Army forces on Oahu but instead should illustrate exactly why they are unnecessary or at least mal-positioned in Hawaii.

“The Army, which fights on terra firma, does not usually land its helicopters on ships — the domain of the Navy and the Marine Corps — but these are not usual times in the U.S. military. As the Obama administration winds down the Army-centric war in Afghanistan, Pentagon leaders are seeking to place the Air Force, Navy and Marines in dominant roles to counter threats in the Asia-Pacific region, which they have deemed to be the nation’s next big national security challenge. Fearful that the new strategy will cut its share of the defense budget, the Army is launching an ambitious campaign to transform itself and assert its relevance in the Pacific. And that, in turn, is drawing the Army into a fight. With the Marines. . . . ‘They’re trying to create a second Marine Corps in the Pacific’, said a Marine General, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the Army’s internal plans. ‘To save their budget, they want to build a force the Nation doesn’t need.’”¹⁰



A US Army CH-47 Chinook lands on the USS Tarawa (LHA-1) during deck qualification in the Pacific Ocean, July 19, 2013. US Army Photo


Having recently elevated USARPAC from a three-star to a four-star headquarters in 2013 is also a weak justification to keep Army forces in Hawaii – a clear sign of the tail wagging the dog. While an argument can be made that the new four star headquarters is now unnecessary, especially given the dramatic personnel cuts the Army must now take, the fact is it exists. But the fact that it exists does not dictate the quantity or location of Army forces under its control. Obviously, regional commands like USARPAC and others that encompass forces stationed in the other 18 states being considered for cuts are going to lose forces due to the Army’s mandated downsizing. And with the reduction in personnel end-strength and corresponding reduction in its worldwide missions, it is very likely and even necessary that some major Army command headquarters will reduce in stature or be eliminated altogether.

“East Asia’s enthusiasm for this ‘pivot’ – the term initially pedaled by the White House – has subsided substantially since then [2012]. In the part of the Pacific that matters most, the waters of the western Pacific from the Sea of Japan through the South China Sea to the Malacca Strait, the U.S. military is decreasing toward a vanishing point. Budget cuts are slashing the overall size of the armed forces and the wars of the Middle East remain a giant, sucking chest wound that demands attention, exposing the Pacific Pivot as all hat, no cattle.”¹¹ In less than two years, a new administration will take over and there is no guarantee the “Pacific Pivot” will be anything more than a footnote; especially in regard to the military instrument of power; by far the worst power to wield effectively in the Asia-Pacific region. Hopefully, misplaced beliefs to satisfy unclear or unsound political motivations are not used to justify keeping Army forces isolated and untrained on the expensive island of Oahu. As in the past, capable and relevant military forces already exist in the Pacific theater; a proven maritime theater that is better served by Marine expeditionary forces, Naval forces and the United States

Air Force. If conventional Army forces are needed for conventional warfare or for productive engagement operations, these forces can be deployed in a combat ready status in a logical and deliberate manner from anywhere in the World more quickly and effectively than from the island state of Hawaii.

“No-Brainer” Strategic Analysis Technique:

To quell the emotionalism and varied opinions on where the Army’s forces are “no kidding” strategically located, it was recently suggested to the Army listening team during their visit to Oahu that they do a fairly simple analysis of each of the regional combatant commands’ war plans and deployment schedules (USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, and USSOUTHCOM). In evaluating these contingency plans, USTRANSCOM or the Joint Staff could easily compare the time it takes to close forces in each of the operational scenarios with varied allocations of units now being considered for personnel cuts. The actual sequencing is classified, but it would be obvious to decision makers with access to this data that divisions deploying early are the more strategic and relevant units that can be moved quickly. Divisions on the bottom of the deployment lists because of lack of lift assets, location or other factors should be the first units cut by the Army. This type of analysis of already available, finely tuned information will take emotion, politics and bad judgment out of the equation and actually make the decisions somewhat immune from political tinkering. The Army should seriously consider this suggestion and let the cards fall where they may.



This suggested analysis focuses on the combat forces that fight the Nation’s wars. It does not focus on the institutional Army organizations that provide training, logistics and administrative support. Bases that provide this type of support are also on the Army’s list of potential bases to be cut. But cutting these bases with anything but incremental salami type cuts is problematic without cutting their roles and missions and this is virtually impossible. Bases that provide these types of support to the Army must be spared from any major cuts. These bases perform critical missions for the Army; missions that must continue despite the reduced size of the overall force. For instance, the National Training Centers at Fort Irwin, CA


and Fort Polk, LA must remain at full strength to fulfill critical training and evaluations. The basic training and individual training schools must continue to function and train recruits, officers and non-commissioned officers in their basic and ongoing professional development (included in this category are all of the career and skill development training centers at Fort Benning, GA, Fort Knox, KY, Fort Sill, OK, JB San Antonio, TX, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, Fort Gordon, GA, Fort Belvoir, VA, Aberdeen PG, MD, JB Langley-Eustis, VA, Fort Lee, VA, Fort Meade, MD, Fort Jackson, SC, Fort Huachuca, AZ, Fort Leavenworth, KS, and Fort Rucker, AL).

The bases that can realistically be considered for such drastic cuts to meet the Army's active duty end-strength numbers are the bases with the Army's combat divisions and brigades. Yet, even many of these should be hands-off to any cuts based on their unique locations and specific skill sets. For instance, there is no sane justification for cutting any forces at the strategic transportation nodes enjoyed by Fort Stewart, GA, Fort Bragg, NC, and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA. There is no justification for cutting divisions with specific skill sets such as the 82nd Airborne Division or the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). There is no justification for cutting forces located near strategic transportation nodes that have world class training areas such as Fort Hood, TX, Fort Bliss, TX, Fort Riley, KS, and Fort Carson, CO. The balance of divisions/brigades not previously mentioned have ready access to transportation nodes and training areas and are located in affordable communities, except for the 25th Infantry Division and its support forces stationed on Oahu. It will be a tragedy for the Army and taxpayers, if politics results in any cuts of Army personnel that do not include the 22,500 noncombat ready military and civilian personnel stationed on the expensive, isolated island state of Hawaii.

Summary:

The Nation can no longer afford to sustain military forces that exceed its requirements nor maintain duplicative capability in the same region. In the case of the Pacific theater of operations, Marine Forces Pacific provides the combatant commander with ready forces with organic capabilities that can respond quickly when needed throughout the Pacific. Keeping conventional Army units in Hawaii does a disservice to the soldiers by keeping them unprepared for combat. It does a disservice to the Army because of the exorbitant costs of stationing soldiers and equipment there. It does a disservice to the Nation by wasting money and having a force isolated from readily available strategic air and sealift. If the Army cannot train on the island of Oahu, is not combat ready there, cannot deploy quickly enough from there and pays a fortune to be based there, then this is where the Army's personnel cuts should be made. For the benefit of US taxpayers, Hawaii state taxpayers, and the Army itself, cutting 22,500 Army personnel in the most expensive, isolated location in the Nation makes the most logical sense.

Strategic Role of the Army in Hawaii ??????





ENDNOTES

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- ¹⁰ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “ Army’s ‘Pacific Pathways’ initiative sets up turf battle with Marines”, [The Washington Post](#), December 29, 2013.
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